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Abstract
Fitch’s Paradox shows that if every truth is knowable, then every truth
is known. Standard diagnoses identify the factivity/negative infalli-
bility of the knowledge operator and Moorean contradictions as the
root source of the result. This paper generalises Fitch’s result to show
that such diagnoses are mistaken. In place of factivity/negative in-
fallibility, the weaker assumption of any ‘level-bridging principle’ suf-
fices. A consequence is that the result holds for some logics in which
the “Moorean contradiction” commonly thought to underlie the result
is in fact consistent. This generalised result improves on the current
understanding of Fitch’s result and widens the range of modalities of
philosophical interest to which the result might be fruitfully applied.
Along the way, we also consider a semantic explanation for Fitch’s re-
sult which answers a challenge raised by Kvanvig (2006).
1 Introduction
Consider propositions of the form ‘ϕ and it is not known thatϕ’. Such propo-
sitions are unknowable. For otherwise, it would be known that: ϕ and it is
not known that ϕ. And so, it would be the case that: ϕ is known and it is
known that ϕ is not known. And since knowledge is factive, it would be the
case that: ϕ is known andϕ is not known. Contradiction. So, even if propo-
sitions of the form ‘ϕ and it is not known that ϕ’ are true, they cannot be
∗For helpful comments and discussions, I am grateful to Jeremy Goodman, John
Hawthorne, Matt Hewson, and an anonymous referee. I am indebted, most of all, to Tim
Williamson, who provided guidance and feedback on multiple drafts. Research on this pa-
per was supported by the Ertegun Graduate Scholarship and the USC Dana & Dornsife
Graduate School Fellowship.
1
Fitch’s Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles
known. Thus, if every truth is knowable, then there cannot be truths of the
form ‘ϕ and it is not known thatϕ’. In other words, if every truth is knowable,
then every truth is known.
This is a rough sketch of the result commonly known as ‘Fitch’s Paradox’
or the ‘Paradox of Knowability’.1 The literature surrounding Fitch’s result
is extensive and continues to burgeon. However, much of it focuses on its
ramifications for the knowability principle and for anti-realism. This is re-
grettable, for Fitch’s result does not fundamentally pertain to knowability.
Formulated in a bimodal language, Fitch’s result simply trades on certain
properties of the knowledge and possibility operators. At the abstract level,
the result shows that for a certain class of modal logics, assuming that the
modal operators interact in a particular way gives rise to modal collapse.
Given its generality, one might try applying the result to a wider range
of modalities. For instance, substituting belief for knowledge, Fitch’s result
would say that if every truth is possibly believed, then every truth is believed.
The problem is that the standard proof of the result makes use of the factiv-
ity of knowledge. But many interesting modalities, like belief, are not fac-
tive. Some have noted that the requirement of factivity can be relaxed to a
requirement of ‘negative infallibility’. But still, not many modalities of philo-
sophical interest are negatively infallible in the required sense.
This paper generalises Fitch’s result to show that a much weaker and
more general requirement than factivity or negative infallibility suffices. In
particular, a level-bridging principle of any kind will do. Both factivity and
negative infallibility are instances of level-bridging principles. Other exam-
ples include the principle that evidence of evidence is evidence, the princi-
ple that whatever is normal is normally normal, and so on.
This generalisation has far-ranging implications. Most importantly, it
sheds new light on Fitch’s result and reveals a widely accepted diagnosis of
it to be false. Contrary to received wisdom, neither factivity/negative infalli-
bility nor Moorean contradictions are at the root of the result. Furthermore,
the generalised result widens the range of modalities to which Fitch’s result
might be fruitfully applied. There are potentially interesting implications for
various debates involving level-bridging principles and Fitch-like principles
in epistemology and beyond. Along the way, we also consider an illuminat-
ing semantic explanation for Fitch’s result which provides an answer to a
challenge raised by Kvanvig (2006).
1It was noted in Fitch (1963) but was first discovered by Alonzo Church (see Salerno
(2009)).
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Name Axiom Frame Condition
(K) (p → q )→ (p →q ) Trivial
(D) p →♦p Serial
(T) p → p Reflexive
(B) p →♦p Symmetric
(C4) p →p Dense
(4) p →p Transitive
(5) ♦p →♦p Euclidean
(I) p↔p Identity
Table 1: Common axioms and their frame conditions
2 Fitch’s Collapse
First, some preliminaries. Our language will be the propositional bimodal
language with the modal operators, and.2 As usual,♦ is defined as ¬¬
and  as ¬¬.  and ♦ (and similarly,  and ) are each other’s duals. A
(bi)modal logic L is a set of sentences containing all truth-functional tau-
tologies and that is closed under modus ponens (MP) and uniform substi-
tution (US). ϕ is a theorem of L (`L ϕ) iff ϕ ∈ L; otherwise, 0L ϕ. L’ is an
extension of L and L is a sublogic of L′ iff L ⊆ L’. Table 1 lists some common
axioms and their frame conditions. (The corresponding axioms for can be
obtained by substituting each occurrence ofwith and each occurrence
of ♦with ).
In addition to T, Fitch’s result requires two other assumptions. First,
according to DIST, distributes over conjunctions:
(DIST) (ϕ ∧ψ)→ (ϕ ∧ψ).
Second, according to the Necessitation Rule for, ifϕ is a theorem, then so
isϕ:
(RN) If `ϕ, then `ϕ.
Then, according to Fitch’s result:
Fitch’sCollapseTheorem. Let Lbe closedunder RN and let it containDIST
and T. If `L p →p, then `L p↔p.
Proof: First, suppose the Moorean sentence(p ∧¬p ) for a contradiction.
By DIST,p∧¬p . But by T,¬p →¬p . So,p∧¬p . Contradic-
tion. So, by reductio,`L ¬(p∧¬p ). Thus, by RN: `L¬(p∧¬p ). Now,
2Quotation marks are omitted where no risk of confusing use and mention arises.
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suppose `L p → p . Contraposing yields `L ¬p → ¬p . So, by (US),
`L¬(p∧¬p )→¬(p∧¬p ). Thus, it follows from `L¬(p∧¬p ) that
`L ¬(p∧¬p )—or equivalently,`L p →p . Furthermore, by T,`Lp → p .
Thus, `L p↔p .
On the usual epistemic-alethic interpretation of  and , the upshot is
that the knowability principle—the principle that for every proposition, if
it is true, then it is possible to know it—results in the collapse of the logical
distinction between knowledge and truth. Given the knowability principle,
whatever is true is known, and vice versa.
But we can abstract away from the epistemic-alethic interpretation. More
generally, instead of the knowability principle, we have the ‘Fitch Principle’:
(FITCH PRINCIPLE) p →p .
Fitch’s result shows that given some weak assumptions, the Fitch Principle
gives rise to the collapse of . It renders  redundant in that it makes it so
that for every formula ϕ,ϕ and ϕ are logically equivalent.
In principle,  and  admit of a wide range of interpretations. So, one
might try running Fitch’s argument for belief, justification, evidence, prov-
ability, normality, obligation, determinacy, and so on. The main obstacle to
extending Fitch’s result in an interesting way to these and other modalities
is that unlike knowledge, many modalities of philosophical interest do not
satisfy T, the assumption of factivity. Or at any rate, for many modalities,
it is controversial whether they do. So, perhaps it is no surprise that Fitch’s
result has not found many interesting applications beyond cases involving
knowledge.
Some have noted ways of relaxing the assumptions required for Fitch’s
result. For instance, Williamson (1993) demonstrates how the result can be
derived without DIST. But insofar as we are concerned with broadening
the application of Fitch’s result to other modalities, being able to dispense
with DIST or RN is not of much interest. It is the assumption of factiv-
ity, rather than those assumptions, that severely restricts the modalities to
which the result can be fruitfully applied.
A cursory inspection of the proof reveals an obvious way of weakening
the requirement of factivity. In showing that(p ∧¬p ) is a contradiction,
we made use of T to obtain¬p →¬p . However, as Mackie (1980) and
many others note, that is of course already furnished by the weaker axiom
of negative infallibility:
(NI) ¬p →¬p .
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NI is weaker than T in the sense that any modal logic containing T con-
tains NI, but not vice versa. So, with NI in place of T, we can at least show
that the Fitch Principle implies that `L p →p .3
NI is a requirement of negative infallibility. According to it,  is truth-
entailing when it comes to sentences of the form ¬p . For instance, under
the doxastic interpretation, NI encodes the assumption that beliefs about
one’s lack of belief are infallible. If one believes that one does not believe
something, then one does not believe it.4
But weakening the requirement of factivity to one of negative infallibility
does not prove to be much of an advance, at least when it comes to being
able to apply Fitch’s result more widely. Many modalities of philosophical
interest are not widely taken to be negatively infallible in the sense required.
For instance, consider the following counterexample to the negative infalli-
bility of belief:
THE IMPLICIT SEXIST: John is an avowed anti-sexist. In particu-
lar, he is prepared to defend vigorously the equality of the sexes
in intelligence. Yet, in a variety of contexts, John’s behavior and
judgments are systematically sexist. Concerning the individual
women he knows, John rarely thinks they’re as intelligent as the
men he knows, even when John has ample evidence of their in-
telligence. In group discussions, John is systematically less likely
to pay attention to and take seriously the contributions of women.
On the rare occasions when he does judge a woman to have ex-
pressed a novel, interesting idea, he is much more surprised than
he would have been if a man had expressed the same idea. Still,
John is unaware of these dispositions, and he would deny that
he had them if asked (Greco, 2015, 657-658).5
It appears that John both believes that women are inferior and believes that
he does not believe that women are inferior. This contradicts NI, according
to which John’s beliefs about what he does not believe cannot be mistaken.
No doubt there are ways to explain away purported counterexamples like
the ones above. Indeed, the negative infallibility of belief has its defenders.
3It is not so obvious whether `L p → p also holds. As we will later see, the General
Collapse Theorem implies that it does.
4NI has been discussed by a few authors. It is axiom (5c) in Rieger’s doxastic logic
(2015), which he calls ‘negative belief infallibility’. Smullyan (1988, 81) calls agents who
obey NI under the doxastic interpretation of ‘stable’ and those who violate it ‘peculiar’.
Also see system K4! in Chellas (1980, 142).
5Greco cites this example as prima facie evidence that belief does not iterate. His ex-
ample is repurposed here to serve as a counterexample to the negative infallibility of belief.
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And it is validated in the standard KD45 logic for belief. But the mere exis-
tence of disagreement surrounding the negative infallibility of belief thwarts
our ability to apply Fitch’s result to belief with anywhere near the same di-
alectical force as in the case of knowledge. So, it would be desirable to be
able to relax the assumption of factivity further.
However, the prevailing consensus is that this cannot be done. Many
identify the factivity/negative infallibility of the  operator as the funda-
mental source of the modal collapse noted in Fitch’s result. For instance,
Mackie traces the reason for Fitch’s result to the factivity of:
[Fitch’s result] is initially surprising. But only initially. It comes
about because truth-entailing operators can be used to construct
self-refuting expressions (1980, 90).
Similarly, Kvanvig argues that the result and its paradoxicality are intimately
tied to the factivity of:
it does not appear plausible in the least to suppose that consid-
eration of other non-factive epistemic operators will generate
paradoxical results of the sort found in the knowability paradox
(2006, 25).
Stjernberg even goes as far as to take the role that factivity plays in Fitch’s
result as grounds for rejecting the factivity of knowledge:
Fitch’s paradox of knowability also uses the factiveness of knowl-
edge in arriving at the unexpected conclusion that if all truths
are knowable, all truths are known... Since the derivation of the
troubling result rests on using the principle that knowledge is
factive, the Fitch result can also be avoided by giving up factive-
ness (2009, 31-32).
If the prevailing consensus is anything to go by, the prospect of weak-
ening the requirement of factivity to anything less than negative infallibility
seems dire. This would appear to be further vindicated by the fact that Fitch’s
proof involves showing that(p ∧¬p ) is a contradiction. But that is a con-
tradiction if and only if NI is a theorem. So, negative infallibility appears to
be essential to Fitch’s result.
But appearances are misleading. Not only is it possible to weaken the
requirement of negative infallibility, it is possible to weaken it dramatically.
§4 shows that instead of factivity or negative infallibility, any level-bridging
principle will do. But before that, the next section takes a detour into the
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semantic side of things. Although this detour is illuminating and provides
intuitive motivation for the generalised result proved later, the impatient
reader may skip ahead or skim through it without much loss in continuity.
3 A Semantic Perspective
Kvanvig writes:
I am not claiming here that the paradox is unresolvable, that
there is no acceptable way to explain how such a collapse can
be tolerated. After all, we know of other contexts in which such
a collapse occurs: in one quite popular modal system, there is
no logical distinction between actual necessity and possible ne-
cessity, for example. It is worth noticing, however, that the loss
of this distinction is made palatable by a semantic explanation
of the loss, in terms of possible worlds and accessibility relations
among them. Perhaps something similar can be done with the
knowability [principle], or perhaps there is some other way to re-
lieve our discomfort at the lost distinction resulting from Fitch’s
proof. The point I want to insist on is the need for some such
explanation, a need arising from the fact that the result above is
not merely surprising but is, instead, paradoxical (2006, 53-54).
In this section, we sketch a semantic explanation of the kind that Kvanvig
demands. Semantic approaches to Fitch’s result are relatively uncommon.6
This is regrettable. The semantic explanations we sketch below provide a
useful alternate perspective on why modal collapse results from the Fitch
Principle. But more importantly for our purposes, they predict that the threat
of modal collapse arises in a much larger class of modal logics than Fitch’s
original proof suggests. This prediction will inform our conjecture general-
ising Fitch’s result, which we will prove in §4.
We use a standard Kripke possible-worlds semantics. A bimodal Kripke
frame F =<W ,R,R > has a set W as its domain (whose elements we refer
to as ‘worlds’) and two accessibility relations, R and R, relating worlds. If
wRv , we say that w -accesses v or that v is an R-successor of w . Simi-
larly, if wRv , we say that w -accesses v or that v is anR-successor of w .
As is well-known, many common modal axioms have simple corresponding
6Some exceptions include Costa-Leite (2004, 2006), Maffezioli et al. (2012), Fischer
(2013), and Artemov & Protopopescu (2013).
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frame conditions. For instance, T corresponds to the reflexivity of R, 4
corresponds to the transitivity of R, and so on (see Table 1).
It is easy to show that the Fitch Principle, p → p , also has a corre-
sponding frame condition:
Frame Lemma.
F  p →p iff F ∀x∃y (xRy ∧∀z (y Rz → x = z )).
In words, the frame condition for the Fitch Principle is the condition that
every world w (in the domain of the frame) has an R-successor that ei-
ther: (i) has noR-successor or (ii) has w as its soleR-successor. Pictorially
(dashed arrows represent R and solid ones represent R):
w v w v
That is, for each world w , there must be a world v such that either: (i) the
situation on the left occurs (w -accesses v and v does not -access any
world), or; (ii) the one on the right occurs (w -accesses v and v -access
only w ).
For the rest of this section, we restrict our attention to normal modal log-
ics, since many such logics are complete with respect to some class of Kripke
frames. A normal modal logic is a modal logic that contains (K) and (K)
and that is closed under the Necessitation Rules: (RN) (ϕ/ϕ) and RN
(ϕ/ϕ). K ⊕K denotes the smallest normal modal logic. KA1 . . .An ⊕
KA1 . . .Am denotes the smallest normal modal logic containing A1, . . . , A
n

and A1, . . . , A
m
 .
7 For instance,KT⊕KD is the smallest normal modal logic
containing T and D. In certain cases, we use more common notation—for
instance, Triv=KI.
Since all normal modal logics contain DIST and are closed under RN, a
normal modal logic which satisfies the assumptions in Fitch’s Collapse The-
orem is the smallest one containing T, i.e. KT ⊕K. KT ⊕K is com-
plete with respect to frames where R is reflexive. Consider what happens
when we assume the Fitch Principle and impose its frame condition on such
frames. According to the Frame Lemma, the condition that corresponds to
the Fitch Principle is that each world w must have an R-successor that ei-
ther: (i) has no R-successor or (ii) has w as its sole R-successor. But given
7Where A1, . . . , A
n
 are axioms containing occurrences of  but not  and A1, . . . , Am
are axioms containing occurrences of but not.
8
Fitch’s Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles
the assumption that R is reflexive, (i) cannot obtain. So, it must be that (ii):
each world is the sole R-successor of one of its R-successors.
Now, consider an arbitrary world w and let the role of having w as its sole
R-successor be played by v . w and v must be identical. For, by reflexivity,
v -accesses itself. So, if w and v were distinct, that would contradict the
assumption that v has w as its sole R-successor. Thus, the role of having
w as its sole R-successor must be played by w itself. Since w was arbi-
trary, this reasoning generalises. Thus, given the reflexivity of R, the frame
condition for the Fitch Principle forces each world in the frame to-access
only itself. Such frames validate p ↔ p . This would explain why, given
KT⊕K, the Fitch Principle gives rise to the collapse of.
In a similar fashion, we can explain why negative infallibility, in place of
factivity, also suffices. For instance, a normal modal logic which validates
NI but not T is KD4 ⊕K, which is complete with respect to frames in
which R is serial and transitive. By a similar reasoning, we can show that
given the seriality and transitivity of R, the frame condition for the Fitch
Principle also forces each world to-access only itself.
The semantic reasoning has not thus far revealed anything we did not
already know. We already knew that Fitch’s result holds for systems that
validate RN, DIST, and T/NI. But now consider KDC4 ⊕K, which
is complete with respect to frames where R is serial and dense. Consider
what happens when the frame condition for the Fitch Principle is imposed
on such frames. Each world w must have an R-successor that either: (i)
has no R-successor or (ii) has w as its sole R-successor. The seriality of
R rules (i) out. So, it must be that (ii): each world is the sole R-successor
of one of its R-successors.
Now, consider an arbitrary world w and let the role of having w as its
sole R-successor be played by v . In turn, let the role of having v as its sole
R-successor be played by u . w and v must be identical. For, by density, it
follows from uRv that there is a world t such that uRt and t Rv . How-
ever, by assumption, u -accesses only v , and so t and v must be identical,
and so vRv . And since v -accesses itself, v and w cannot be distinct. For,
if they were, that would contradict the assumption that v -accesses onlyw .
Thus, the role of havingw as its soleR-successor must be played byw itself.
And since w was arbitrary, this generalises to every world. Thus, given the
seriality and density of R, the frame condition for the Fitch Principle again
forces each world to-access only itself. If this reasoning is sound, then the
Fitch Principle should also give rise to the collapse of, given KDC4⊕K.
And if Fitch’s result holds for KDC4⊕K, then it also holds for KD5⊕
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K, which extends KDC4⊕K. But this would mean that neither factivity
nor negative infallibility is required for Fitch’s result, since neither KDC4⊕
K nor KD5⊕K contains T or NI. For, consider:
p
(p ∧¬p )
p ¬p
Since the accessibility relation for  is serial and dense, this is a model of
KDC4⊕K. It is not difficult to check that it is also a model of KD5⊕K.
Thus, (p ∧¬p ) is consistent in both KDC4 ⊕K and KD5 ⊕K, since
it is satisfied at the leftmost point of the model. And we have shown that if
(p ∧¬p ) is consistent, then NI is not a theorem and thus neither is T.
So, it would appear that Fitch’s result holds for a larger class of logics than is
commonly recognised. In particular, it appears to hold even for logics where
 is neither factive nor negatively infallible.
Before we consider a significant caveat to this, we should note another
interesting prediction that the semantic reasoning makes. ConsiderKDB⊕
K, which is complete with respect to frames whereR is serial and symmet-
ric. Again, if we impose the frame condition for the Fitch Principle on such
frames, then each world w must have an R-successor that either: (i) has
no R-successor or (ii) has w as its sole R-successor. Again, the seriality of
R rules (i) out. So, by (ii), each world is the sole R-successor of one of its
R-successors.
Again, consider an arbitrary world w and let the role of having w as its
sole R-successor be played by v . In turn, let the role of having v as its sole
R-successor be played by u . u and w must be identical. For, by symme-
try, it follows from uRv that vRu . And so, if u and w were distinct, this
would contradict the assumption that v -accesses only w . Thus, u and
w are identical (and u and v are either distinct or identical). Thus, given
the seriality and symmetry ofR, the frame condition for the Fitch Principle
forces the frame to contain only non-reflexive, symmetric-pairs of worlds
(if u 6= v ) and/or worlds that-access only themselves (if u = v ):
Such frames validate p↔p . This suggests an extension of Fitch’s result.
With the logics considered previously, the Fitch Principle results in the col-
lapse of (i.e. ϕ andϕ are logically equivalent). It would seem that with
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KDB⊕K, the Fitch Principle results in the collapse of (i.e. ϕ andϕ
are logically equivalent).
At this juncture, it is important to note a caveat. The kind of semantic rea-
soning engaged in throughout this section does not have the force of proper
proofs. And that is because to reason as we did, we require certain com-
pleteness results which are not readily available. For instance, one result
that is missing would show that the smallest normal extension of KT⊕K
containing the Fitch Principle is complete with respect to the class of frames
where R is reflexive and the frame condition for the Fitch Principle is satis-
fied. Another would show that the smallest normal extension of KD4⊕K
containing the Fitch Principle is complete with respect to the class of frames
where R is serial and transitive, and the frame condition for the Fitch Prin-
ciple is satisfied. And so on. Without such results, we cannot properly infer
what is provable in certain logics containing the Fitch Principle from what
holds in certain frames satisfying its corresponding frame condition.
Nevertheless, as we will soon see, the predictions of the semantic rea-
soning are in fact vindicated. So, that provides some evidence that the re-
quired completeness results can be had, though proving them lies beyond
the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, that does not render this section all
for naught. Taking the semantic explanations as merely suggestive predic-
tions about when the Fitch Principle might generate modal collapse turns
out to be highly instructive. Those predictions inform a conjecture general-
ising Fitch’s result, which we can prove via non-semantic means. That is the
aim of the next section.
4 General Collapse
We know from Fitch’s result that the Fitch Principle gives rise to the collapse
of (i.e. ` p↔p ) inKT⊕K andKD4⊕K. The semantic explanation
in the previous section predicts that this collapse also occurs inKDC4⊕K
and KD5 ⊕K. Furthermore, it also predicts that the Fitch Principle gives
rise to the collapse of (i.e. ` p↔p ) in KDB⊕K.
An interesting pattern emerges. Let M1 and M2 denote arbitrary strings
of  and ♦. And let |M1 −M2| be the difference in the number of operators
in M1 and M2. For instance, if M1 = and M2 =♦♦, then |M1−M2| = 3.
And if M1 = ♦♦♦♦ and M2 = ♦, then |M1 −M2| = 5. Notice that the
logics for which the Fitch Principle is expected to give rise to the collapse of
 all extend some logic of the formKDX⊕K, where X isM1p →M2p with
|M1−M2| = 1. For instance, T (p → p ) has one operator to the left of the
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conditional and none to the right, andKT⊕K is equivalent toKDT⊕K,
since T implies D. Similarly, 4 (p →p ), 5 (♦p →♦p ), and C4
(p →p ) each has two operators on one side of the conditional and one
on the other. Notice furthermore that B (p →♦p ), on the other hand, has
two operators on the right of the conditional and none on the other. Thus,
the logic for which the Fitch Principle is expected to give rise to the collapse
of is of the formKDX⊕K, where X is M1p →M2p with |M1−M2|= 2.
A natural conjecture is thus that the ‘degree’ of modal collapse caused by
the Fitch Principle in logics extending KDX ⊕K, where X is of the form
M1p → M2p , is a function of the difference in the number of operators in
M1 and M2. More specifically, when |M1−M2|= n , the Fitch Principle gives
rise to the collapse of n (where n abbreviates n ≥ 0 iterations of  and
0 is the empty string). Or to put things differently, let us call a principle of
the form M1p →M2p with |M1−M2|= n an ‘n-level bridging principle’. So,
for instance, T (p → p ) and 4 (p →p ) are both one-level bridging
principles, whereas B (p →♦p ) is a two-level bridging principle. And call
p↔np ‘nth-degree modal collapse’. Then, the conjecture is that given an
n-level bridging principle, the Fitch Principle gives rise tonth-degree modal
collapse.
The aim of this section is to prove this conjecture. More precisely, we
prove the following generalisation of Fitch’s result:
General Collapse Theorem. Let L be closed under RN and RM, and let
it contain D and some n-level bridging principle. If `L p → p, then `L
p↔np.8
RM is the Monotonicity Rule for. According to it, if ϕ→ψ is a theo-
rem, then so isϕ→ψ:
(RM) If `ϕ→ψ, then `ϕ→ψ.
We call modal logics closed under RM ‘-monotonic’. A fact about -
monotonic logics is that they validate Duality:
(DUALITY) If `M1p →M2p , then ` M˜2p → M˜1p ,
8The General Collapse Theorem is a result in bimodal logic. But since nothing in the
proof depends on  and  being distinct operators, the following is an immediate conse-
quence for monomodal logics:
Corollary 1. Let L be closed under RN and RM, and let it contain D and some n-level
bridging principle. If `L p →♦p, then `L p↔np.
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where, in general, M˜ is the dual string of M (e.g. if M = ♦♦, then M˜ =
♦♦). It is well known that normal modal logics validate Duality. For in-
stance, it is a familiar fact that given normality, T (p → p ) can be equiva-
lently formulated as p →♦p and 4 (p →p ) as ♦♦p →♦p , and so on.
-monotonicity suffices for this to hold. Furthermore, as in normal modal
logics, also distributes over conjunctions in-monotonic logics. That is,
all-monotonic logics contain DIST.
Given these facts, we can prove the General Collapse Theorem in three
simple steps. The first step is to show that given RM and D, any n-level
bridging principle implies mp → ♦m+np , for some m . The second step is
to show that given RM, RN, and the Fitch Principle, mp → ♦m+np im-
plies p → ♦np , for any m ,n . The third and final step is to show that given
RM, RN, and the Fitch Principle, p →♦np implies p↔np , for any n .
Step 1. First, we show:
Lemma 1. Let L be closed under RM and let it contain D. If L contains an
n-level bridging principle, then L containsmp →♦m+np, for some m.
This is fairly intuitive. To illustrate, consider the following two-level bridg-
ing principle: ♦p → ♦p . Now, according to D, p → ♦p . So, in-
tuitively, p → ♦p and ♦p → ♦♦♦♦p . And so, it follows from
♦p →♦p thatp → ♦♦♦♦p , i.e. 2p → ♦4p . So, Lemma 1 holds
in this instance. Alternatively, consider a two-level bridging principle with
more operators on the left-hand side: e.g. ♦p →♦p . By Duality, it is
equivalent to one with more operators on the right hand side, i.e. ♦p →
♦♦♦p . Thus, in the same way as before, we can use D to derive 2p →
♦4p .
This reasoning generalises. Any n-level bridging principle either is or is
equivalent by Duality to a principle of the form O1 . . .Omp → O ′1 . . .O ′m+np ,
for some m , where each O1 . . .Om ,O
′
1 . . .O
′
m+n is either  or ♦. Intuitively, it
follows from D that mp → O1 . . .Omp and O ′1 . . .O ′m+np → ♦m+np . And
so, any n-level bridging principle implies, for some m ,mp →♦m+np . The
idea behind the proof is simple. The only technicality is checking that RM
is strong enough for regimenting the informal line of reasoning above—that
is a tedious but easy exercise.
Step 2. Second, we show:
Lemma 2. Let L be closed under RN and RM, and let it contain the Fitch
Principle. For any m ,n, if `Lmp →♦m+np, then `L p →♦np.
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The proof of this relies on the fact that given the Fitch Principle, we can grad-
ually subtract from `L mp →♦m+np a on the left of the conditional and
a ♦ on the right. That is, we can show that for any i ≥ 0:
if `Li+1p →♦(i+1)+np , then `Lip →♦i+np . (†)
In turn, the proof of this uses exactly the same kind of reasoning that under-
lies the usual proof of Fitch’s result.
First, we identify a ‘Moorean’ contradiction. Suppose for a contradiction
that (ip ∧¬♦i+np ). Distributing  over the conjunction yields i+1p ∧
¬♦i+np . However, contraposing the antecedent of (†) yields`L¬♦i+np →
¬i+1p . Thus, given the antecedent of (†), we derive a contradiction: i+1p∧
¬i+1p . So, by reductio,`L ¬(ip∧¬♦i+np ). And so by RN,`L¬(ip∧
¬♦i+np ). Now, since L contains the Fitch Principle, i.e. `L p → p , by
contraposition, `L¬p →¬p . And so, by (US), `L¬(ip ∧¬♦i+np )→
¬(ip∧¬♦i+np ). Thus, it follows from what we showed above that`L ¬(ip∧
¬♦i+np )—or equivalently,`Lip →♦i+np . Thus, (†). And from that, Lemma
2 easily follows since by (†), `Lmp →♦m+np implies`Lm−1p →♦m+n−1p ,
which in turn implies `L m−2p → ♦m+n−2p , and so on until `L m−mp →
♦m+n−mp .
Step 3. Finally, we show:
Lemma 3. Let L be closed under RN and RM, and let it contain the Fitch
Principle. For any n, if `L p →♦np, then `L p↔np.9
It is an immediate consequence of Duality that if`L p →♦np , then`Lnp →
p . So, all that is left to show is that if `L p → ♦np , then `L p → np . We
prove this by showing that given the Fitch Principle, we can turn the♦’s into
’s, one by one, from the inside out. That is, we prove by induction on the
number i of operators that for any i ≤ n :
if `L p →♦np , then `L p →♦n−iip . (*)
The base case where i = 0 is trivial. For the inductive step, let the inductive
hypothesis be: if `L p → ♦np , then `L p → ♦n−iip . We will show that: if
`L p →♦np , then `L p →♦n−(i+1)i+1p .
Again, the proof of this is similar to the usual proof of Fitch’s result. First,
we identify a ‘Moorean’ contradiction. Suppose `L p → ♦np . And assume
9Note that the case where n = 1 is just Fitch’s original result, since by Duality, T is
equivalent to p →♦1p .
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for a contradiction that (p ∧ ¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p ). By DIST, p ∧¬♦n−(i+1)
i+1p . However, by the inductive hypothesis: `L p →♦n−iip . It follows by
(US) that`Lp →♦n−ii+1p . And so by contraposition,`L¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p
→¬p . And thus fromp∧¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p , we can derive a contradiction:
p ∧¬p . So, by reductio, `L ¬(p ∧¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p ). And so by RN, `L
¬(p ∧¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p ). Now, assume the Fitch Principle, `L p →p . By
contraposition,`L¬p →¬p . And so, by (US),`L¬(p∧¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p )
→ ¬(p ∧¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p ). Thus, it follows from what we showed above that
`L ¬(p ∧¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p )—or equivalently, `L p → ♦n−(i+1)i+1p . This com-
pletes the inductive step. And thus, (*), from which Lemma 3 easily follows
(let i = n).
The General Collapse Theorem follows from Lemmas 1-3 by a simple
chain of implications. So, we have generalised Fitch’s result so that factiv-
ity/negative infallibility is not required. In its place is the much more general
requirement of a level-bridging principle of any kind. More specifically, we
showed that given some weak background assumptions, the presence of an
n-level bridging principle means that the Fitch Principle gives rise to nth-
degree modal collapse. That is, given `M1p →M2p , where |M1 −M2| = n ,
if ` p → p then ` p ↔ np . For instance, given a three-level bridg-
ing principle like p → ♦♦p , the Fitch Principle gives rise to third-degree
modal collapse (i.e. the collapse of).
But for all we have shown, it is possible that a stronger result holds. Per-
haps the three-level bridging principle above also suffices for the Fitch Prin-
ciple to give rise to second-degree modal collapse. Or, perhaps given the
Fitch Principle, any level-bridging principle whatsoever suffices for the full
collapse of . That is not ruled out by the General Collapse Theorem. But
that is not the case. The modal collapse identified in the General Collapse
Theorem is, in a sense, the full extent of the collapse. The degree of the
modal collapse that occurs really is essentially a function of the difference in
the number of operators in the level-bridging principle. For a precise state-
ment and proof of this, the reader is referred to the Appendix.
5 Diagnosing Fitch’s Result
The General Collapse Theorem informs our understanding of Fitch’s result
in important ways. In particular, it invalidates standard diagnoses of the
result. First, factivity or negative infallibility is often thought to be the ul-
timate source of the modal collapse identified in Fitch’s result. The quotes
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from Mackie, Kvanvig, and Stjernberg from earlier are illustrative. However,
the General Collapse Theorem shows that what underlies the result is, more
generally, a level-bridging principle of any kind. To be sure, the principles of
factivity and negative infallibility are instances of level-bridging principles.
But to identify factivity or negative infallibility as the root of Fitch’s result
would be to falsely diagnose as a cause what is in fact merely a symptom of
a more general pathology.
Another common diagnosis takes ‘Moorean’ contradictions of the form
(p ∧ ¬p ) to be at the base of Fitch’s result. A key step of Fitch’s orig-
inal proof involves showing that (p ∧ ¬p ) is a contradiction. This has
led many to believe that Fitch’s result is inextricably linked to Moorean sen-
tences. For instance: “the Moore sentence is at the root of Fitch’s famous
“paradox of knowability”” (Holliday & Icard III, 2010); “the Fitch paradox...
can be seen as derivative from Moore’s paradox” (Bonnay & Égré, 2011, 105);
“the epistemic Moore sentence p ∧ ¬Kap lies... at the bottom of the Fitch
paradox” (Égré, 2014, 538); “Fitch’s paradox is intimately tied to [the] so-
called “Moore’s paradox”” (Cresto, 2017).
While contradictions that might very loosely be called ‘Moorean’ do play
a role (the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3 make use of such contradictions), the
connection between Moorean phenomena and the Fitchean phenomena of
modal collapse is more complicated than commonly thought. The General
Collapse Theorem implies that the Fitch Principle can give rise to the col-
lapse of  even for logics in which (p ∧¬p ) is consistent. In particular,
the General Collapse Theorem applies to KDC4 ⊕K and KD5 ⊕K. As
we showed in §3,(p ∧¬p ) is consistent in those logics.10
These improvements on our understanding of the source of Fitch’s re-
sult and its extent have important downstream consequences. In partic-
ular, they help in evaluating various responses to the result. For instance,
consider those who cite Fitch’s result as a reason to reject the principle that
knowledge is factive:
In discussions of Fitch’s paradox, it is usually assumed without
further argument that knowledge is factive, that if a subject knows
that p , then p is true. It is argued that this common assump-
tion is not as well-founded as it should be, and that there in fact
10Instead of those of the form (p ∧¬p ), one might characterise Moorean sentences
(for a logic L) more broadly as sentences of the formϕ such thatϕ is consistent butϕ is
not (i.e. 0L ¬ϕ and `L ¬ϕ). Sentences ϕ with this feature are sometimes called ‘(logical)
blindspots’ (Sorensen, 1988). But doing this will not help restore the connection between
Fitch’s result and Moorean phenomena—for, it is obvious that Fitch’s result holds forTriv⊕
K, for which there are no ‘blindspots’.
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are certain reasons to be suspicious of the unrestricted version
of the factiveness claim... Since the derivation of the troubling
result rests on using the principle that knowledge is factive, the
Fitch result can also be avoided by giving up factiveness (Stjern-
berg, 2009, 29-32).
The General Collapse Theorem deprives this kind of response of any force.
Contra Stjernberg, Fitch’s result cannot be avoided by simply giving up the
factivity of knowledge. In fact, every single level-bridging principle for knowl-
edge must be given up.11
Another upshot concerns analogues of the knowability principle with
non-factive operators in place of knowledge. For instance, Mackie (1980)
and Chase & Rush (2018) discuss analogues of the knowability principle in-
volving justification and verification, Edgington (1985, 2010) and Williamson
(forthcoming) discuss analogues involving probability, predictability, and
non-factive evidence, and Chalmers (2012) considers an analogue involving
scrutability. The General Collapse Theorem shows that whether the opera-
tor in question is factive/negatively infallible does not go to the heart of the
matter. The threat of modal collapse looms so long as the operator obeys
some level-bridging principle. For instance, if having been verified to be
verified implies having been verified, then the verifiability principle is just
as vulnerable to Fitch’s result as the knowability principle.
The General Collapse Theorem also brings into question other uses to
which Fitch’s result has been put. For instance, Chase & Rush (2018) ar-
gue that the result poses special problems for internalists about justification.
They recognise that, in place of T, D and 4 suffice for Fitch’s result. In-
terpreting in terms of justification, they surmise that since internalists are
inclined to accept 4, they are forced to reject the justificatory analogue of
the knowability principle, on pain of losing the logical distinction between
truth and justification. But given the General Collapse Theorem, even if this
is a problem, it is not a problem specific to internalists. For, it is not only in-
ternalists who accept 4 that have to reject the justifiability principle. Any-
one who accepts any level-bridging principle for justification must too. And
it is not clear that the tenability of level-bridging principles like ‘if there is
justification for there being justification for p , then there is not justification
for not-p ’ is a partisan issue divided along internalist-externalist lines. So,
11That is, every non-trivial level-bridging principle, i.e. n-level bridging principles
where n 6= 0. For convenience, I will often write ‘level-bridging principles’ when I mean
‘non-trivial level-bridging principles’. Context should make it clear when the trivial case is
meant to be excluded.
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Fitch’s result cannot be mobilised in the way that Chase and Rush do to ad-
judicate on the internalist-externalist debate.
6 The Fitch Principle vs Level-Bridging Principles
The General Collapse Theorem has other important implications. It exposes
a tension between the Fitch Principle, on the one hand, and level-bridging
principles for , on the other. Together, they give rise to modal collapse.
And since modal collapse of any degree is undesirable for most modalities
of philosophical interest, either the Fitch Principle must be rejected or all
level-bridging principles must be rejected. This has potentially interesting
implications for issues spanning many areas for philosophy.
6.1 The Fitch Principle
First, consider the Fitch Principle. The doxastic-deontic interpretation of
and  is an interesting case. On such an interpretation, the Fitch Principle
(p →p ) formalises a weak, narrow-scope truth norm of belief:
(TRUTH) If p is true, then it is permissible to believe p .
Whiting (2013) and others defend such a norm. TRUTH also follows from var-
ious other norms, such as: the strong narrow-scope truth norm according
to which, if p is true, then it is obligatory to believe p ; or (assuming that the
permissibility of being certain that p implies the permissibility of believing
p ) the norm according to which if p is true, then it is permissible to be cer-
tain that p ; or (assuming that the permissibility of asserting p implies the
permissibility of believing p ), the norm according to which if p is true, then
it is permissible to assert that p ; and so on.
The background assumptions of the General Collapse Theorem (i.e. RM
and RN) are plausible on the doxastic-deontic interpretation. In fact, both
doxastic and deontic logic are standardly taken to satisfy KD45. The up-
shot is that given any level-bridging principle for belief, TRUTH gives rise to
modal collapse. In particular, given any one-level bridging principle like ‘be-
lieving implies believing that one believes’, TRUTH results in the loss of any
logical distinction between truth and belief—everything true is believed and
everything believed is true. Similarly, given any two-level bridging principle
like ‘believing that one believes that one believes p implies that p is con-
sistent with one’s beliefs’, TRUTH results in the loss of any logical distinction
between truth and second-order belief—everything true is believed to be
believed and vice versa.
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Modal collapse of any degree is undesirable, since truth is not equiva-
lent to belief of any order. Thus, proponents of TRUTH must reject every
level-bridging principle for belief. Consequently, so must proponents of
norms that entail TRUTH, like the ones previously listed. To be sure, this is
not a decisive refutation of TRUTH or those stronger norms. But the fact that
their proponents are so severely restricted in which principles governing be-
lief they can endorse might diminish the appeal of those norms. Notably,
competing norms for belief, such as wide-scope truth norms or knowledge
norms, do not obviously face similar problems, since unlike TRUTH, their
logical forms do not map onto that of the Fitch Principle.
There might be lingering suspicions that this problem is simply deriva-
tive of the problem that Moorean sentences are thought to pose for truth
norms of belief (see Bykvist & Hattiangadi (2007, 2013)). Such concerns about
the novelty of the problem raised here are easily dispelled. We have already
seen that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no straightforward con-
nection between Moorean phenomena and the phenomenon of modal col-
lapse identified in the General Collapse Theorem.
Besides the doxastic-deontic interpretation, there are various other in-
teresting interpretations of the Fitch Principle to consider. To note just one,
interpret  as ‘God wills it to be the case that’ and  as ‘it is logically nec-
essary that’. Then, the Fitch Principle is the principle according to which
every truth is such that it is logically possible that God wills it to be the case.
This seems undeniable for an omnipotent being. However, the upshot of the
General Collapse Theorem is that if obeys any level-bridging principle at
all (for instance, the one-level bridging principle according to which God’s
will is ‘non-akratic’, in the sense that if God wills that God wills that p , then
God wills that p ) then modal collapse occurs—whatever is true is God’s will
and vice versa.12 This is an undesirable result for theists.
6.2 Level-Bridging Principles
Besides principles that have the form of the Fitch Principle, the General Col-
lapse Theorem also sheds light on various level-bridging principles, many
of which are the subject of vigorous debate. For instance, externalists and
internalists are divided on level-bridging principles for justification, such
as: if there is justification for believing something, then there is justification
for believing that there is justification for believing it (J p → J J p ); its con-
12A background assumption is D, the assumption that God’s will is consistent (i.e. if
God wills that p , then God does not will that not-p ).
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verse (J J p → J p ); if there is not justification for believing something, then
there is justification for believing that there is not justification for believing
it (¬J p → J¬J p ); and its converse (J¬J p → ¬J p ) (see Smithies (2012) for
a defence of all four principles). The upshot of the General Collapse The-
orem is that accepting any such principle requires rejecting p → J p , for
any interpretation of on which RN is plausible. For instance, it requires
denying that every truth is such that there is possibly justification for believ-
ing it, every truth is such that there is permissibly justification for believing
it, and so on.
Various level-bridging principles for evidence are also matters of dispute.
For instance, proponents of the ‘E=K ’-thesis like Williamson (2000) believe
that evidence is factive (Ep → p ) while others disagree. There is also dis-
agreement about whether evidence of evidence is evidence (E Ep → Ep )
(see Feldman (2014) and Fitelson (2012)). If either of those principles hold,
then on pain of modal collapse, p →Ep must fail for any interpretation of
 on which RN is plausible. For instance, it cannot be that every truth is
such that for all one knows, there is evidence for it or that every truth is such
that it is not normally the case that there is not evidence for it.
Similarly, there is debate surrounding level-bridging principles for other
interpretations of . For instance, Smith’s (2006) logic validates the princi-
ple that whatever is normally the case is normally, normally the case (Np →
NNp ), which Carter (forthcoming) challenges. The issue of whether ‘ought’
iterates (Op →OOp ) is also a live one (see Immerman (forthcoming)).
This is far from an exhaustive list of interesting level-bridging principles
to consider. But in each case, the General Collapse Theorem shows that ac-
cepting a level-bridging principle for requires rejecting the Fitch Principle
(p →p ) for any interpretation of on which RN is plausible, insofar as
modal collapse is to be avoided. The hope is that in each case, weighing
the relevant level-bridging principles against various principles of the form
p →p can help shed light on the tenability of those level-bridging prin-
ciples and help move the debates forward.
But one might be skeptical about whether this kind of application of the
General Collapse Theorem can actually inform the debates on level-bridging
principles in any interesting way. After all, on the original epistemic-alethic
interpretation, when it came down to choosing between the factivity of knowl-
edge and the knowability principle, it is clearly the latter that should be re-
jected. So, why think that the tension between the level-bridging principles
and the Fitch Principle should ever put any pressure on the level-bridging
principles? Why shouldn’t the tension always be resolved in favour of the
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level-bridging principles, as in the epistemic-alethic case?
The difference is that it is not always as clear as in the epistemic-alethic
case whether to place the blame for the threat of modal collapse on the
Fitch Principle or on the level-bridging principles. For one, the various level-
bridging principles for justification, evidence, normality, obligation, and so
on are nowhere near as uncontentious as the factivity of knowledge. For
another, in the case of knowledge, Fitch’s proof already furnishes straight-
forward counterexamples to the knowability principle of the form ‘p and it
is not known that p ’. And while this is also the case with other factive oper-
ators, we have already noted that, depending on the level-bridging princi-
ple under consideration, there may not always be similarly straightforward
counterexamples to the Fitch Principle, since(p∧¬p ) may not always be
a contradiction.
In fact, there are unlikely to be highly general and abstract considerations
that adjudicate between the Fitch Principle and the level-bridging princi-
ples. Whether it is the level-bridging principles that should give way to the
Fitch Principle or the other way around will likely have to be decided on a
case-by-case basis. Each particular interpretation of deserves specialised
attention. The task of weighing the Fitch Principle against the various level-
bridging principles, for each interpretation of , lies beyond the scope of
this paper.
7 Conclusion
Hart called Fitch’s result “an unjustly neglected logical gem” (1979, 164). This
remark of Hart’s was made four decades ago, which is more than a decade
after the publication of Fitch’s paper and more than three decades since
Alonzo Church first conveyed the result to Fitch in 1945. The intervening
years since Hart’s remark have seen a massive upsurge in interest in the re-
sult, mostly focusing on its implications for the knowability principle and for
anti-realism. Even so, as I hope to have shown in this paper, we have barely
scratched the surface of the logical and philosophical gem that is Fitch’s re-
sult. Up till now, we have failed to appreciate the full extent and generality
of the result and its potential applicability to a wide variety of philosophi-
cal issues, ranging from norms for belief and whether evidence of evidence
is evidence to iteration principles for normality and obligation. Once gen-
eralised, the potential of Fitch’s result is limitless, constrained only by our
ability to think of interesting modalities to apply it to.
But that is not all. Further underscoring Hart’s remark concerning the
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neglected potential of Fitch’s result is the fact that the possibility of extend-
ing Fitch’s result in interesting ways goes beyond what we showed in this
paper. In this paper, we focused on the Fitch Principle (p → p ). But we
might consider, more generally, for any principle of the form X (ϕ→ψ), its
modally qualified counterpart, X (ϕ→ ψ). On the alethic interpretation
of, while X is the principle thatϕ impliesψ, X is the apparently weaker
principle that ϕ implies possiblyψ. Put very generally, the lesson of Fitch’s
result is that in some cases, X might turn out to be as strong as its unquali-
fied counterpart, X. In particular, the Fitch Principle (p →p ) turns out
to be as strong as its unqualified counterpart, p →p .
In San (forthcoming), I show that this insight can be generalised to many
other interesting instances of X and X

. For example, given some weak as-
sumptions, 4 (p → p ) and 5 (♦p → ♦p ) turn out to jointly im-
ply 4 (p → p ) and 5 (♦p → ♦p ). This means, for instance, that
interpreting  in terms of knowledge and  in terms of alethic necessity,
the apparently weak variants of KK and K¬K—according to which knowing
implies the possibility of knowing that one knows and not knowing implies
the possibility of knowing that one does not know—taken together, turn out
to have the full logical strength of their unqualified counterparts, KK and
K¬K—according to which knowing implies knowing that one knows and not
knowing implies knowing that one does not know. This has important epis-
temological implications, which I explore in another paper.
It remains to be seen what further logical and philosophical insights can
be mined from Fitch’s result.
A Appendix
We show that the modal collapse identified in the General Collapse Theorem
is, in a sense, the full extent of the collapse. More precisely:
No Collapse Theorem. Let X be an n-level bridging principle and let L be
the smallest normal extension of KDX⊕S5 containing the Fitch Principle.
Then, for every i 6= kn, where k is an integer, 0L p ↔ ip . (Thus, also 0L′
p↔ip, for every sublogic L′ of L).
In particular, there is a model of L where for every i 6= kn , p ∧¬ip is
satisfied somewhere. First, let there be countably infinitely many worlds,
with each one indexed by an integer. Then, let R be such that each world
-accesses only the world whose index is the integer succeeding it, i.e. . . . ,
w−2Rw−1,w−1Rw0, w0Rw1, w1Rw2, . . . . And let R be the universal ac-
cessibility relation, i.e. every world -accesses every other world. Finally,
22
Fitch’s Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles
let p be true only at wkn , for every integer k . More formally, the model
M =<W ,R,R,V > is such that:
W = {wi | i ∈Z};
R = {<wi ,wi+1 > | i ∈Z};
R = {<wi ,w j > | i , j ∈Z};
V (p ) = {wi | i = kn ,k ∈Z}, for every propositional letter p .
The resulting model is depicted below with solid arrows representingR and
dashed ones representing R (with the reflexive and transitive R–arrows
omitted):
p
w0
¬p
w1
. . . ¬p wn−1
p wn¬p
wn+1
. . .¬p
w2n−1
¬pw−1 . . . ¬p
w−n+1
p
w−n
. . .
. . .
Clearly, by construction, for every i 6= kn , p ∧ ¬ip is satisfied at w0.
So, all that is left to check is that the model above is a model of L. It is a
model of KD ⊕ S5, since R is serial and R is universal. Furthermore,
for any m , ♦mp → m+np is satisfied throughout the model. (Intuitively,
this is because the model is constructed such that things look exactly the
same from the perspective of worlds that are n-steps apart). And we can
prove that, given D, for anyn-level bridging principle, there is somem such
that ♦mp → m+np is stronger (in a way similar to the proof of Lemma 1
that given D, for any n-level bridging principle, there is some m such that
mp → ♦m+np is weaker). And so, if ♦mp →m+np is satisfied throughout
the model for any m , then so is any n-level bridging principle. So, where X
is an n-level bridging principle, the model above is a model of KDX⊕S5.
Finally, the model also satisfies the frame condition associated with the
Fitch Principle (see the Frame Lemma), since every world-accesses some
world that-accesses only it. In particular, for every integerk ,wk -accesses
wk−1 and wk−1 -accesses only wk . Thus, the model above is a model of L,
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whereL is the smallest normal extension ofKDX⊕S5 containing the Fitch
Principle. And so, the No Collapse Theorem follows.
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